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--------------. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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-vs-
RONALD RAY HERZOG, : !~·' .·~~~ . 
. ' : ,i;; . ' 1 
Defendant-A.ppell•t.. ~. ·. 1·.;,,,f;, 
, ./ 1' t I ~- 1 ~ ~ 
- - - - - - - .;,.)-r ~ ~;' ' 
' ')';, 
BRIEF 01!' 
--------; 
..... " 
APPEAL FJlOM.A 
THIRD JUDic:;cAlt ~- . ~ .. 
SALT LAKE COJllil'l.'t', 
HONORABLE nf9 If:,;>' 
- - - .;_' ;_J ~ '~~" 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
RONhLD RAY HERZOG, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
3RIIF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
16441 
~;~ella~t Kas convicted of th2 cri~e of rape in 
::Le r:-,:c:::-6 0-..iC:ic_:_al Dis-crict Court, in and for Salt Lake 
Countc', State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, 
presiding. 
=::::s::osrno:: I'J THE LO'.:ER CO'JFT 
After appellant's conviction he was sentenced 
::o :: ::er~ of one ::c fifteen years in the Uta~ State Prison 
and ~as placed on probation on condition that he serve 
six months in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the judgment 
rencered by the trial court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Al though respondent is in substantial agreement 
with appellant's statement of facts, one discrepancy a~ 
one material omission merit comment. First, appellant's 
assertion thac: the prosecutrix made no attempt to flee 
is erroneous. Under direct and cross-examination the 
prosecutrix testified that she attempted to get out of t~ 
truck but her effort was thwarted by appellant (T.45,67, 
76,79). The prosecutrix's description of the incident 
~as =orrobora~ed by appellant who testified tnat the 
::~2:=::.:u-:.ri:: t~-ir=:C. "":.c ~scape but he s~c?ped her b~· 
qra~bing jer and telling ~er tnat she ~as not going to 
">:al!; (T.2.12,L3,2.23,L>~,l25,123). In addition, ~'.12 
prosecu~rix c:ee~~~ied t~at she could ~ot have escaped 
when she exited the truck to remove her clothing because 
appellant also stepped out of the truck, effectively 
blocking tje onl; avenue of escape (T.~6,67,79). SeccnC:, 
testimony of both the prosecutrix and appellant indicates 
rr,ec: with piys~cal res~raint and threats by appellant did 
the prosecutrix refrain from making further attempts 
to escape. The prosecutrix stated that she acquiesced ~ 
appellant's demand out of fear. She was frightened of 
provoking hi~ an~ bei~g hilrt (T.45,~G,78,79). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
WAS SUFFICIENT FOR REASONABLE MINDS TO 
HAVE FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
The Utah Supreme Court enunciated the standard 
by which it will review jury findings to determine 
whether there was sufficient evidence presented at 
trial to sustain a conviction. In State v. Allgood, 
28 Utah 2d 119, 499 P. 2d 269 (1972), the Court stated: 
. to set aside a jury verdict 
the evi6ence must appear so inconclusive 
or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds 
ac::ing fairly upon it must have entertained 
reaso~able doubt that the defendant 
cc::-~--._:_ ::::ed L1e cri::ie. 
S:ce c.lso State ·v. '.!ills, 122 Utah 306, 249 P. 2d 211 (1952); 
State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957); State 
v. Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 146 (1960); State v. 
:.\iEs, 530 P.2d 1272 ((.)tc_h 19T5); State y. Romero, 554 P.2C. 
21~ (Utah 1976). 
assumes that the Jury believed that which supports its 
verdict. State v. Reddish, 550 P.2d 728 }Utah 1976). With 
this principle in mind it is necessary to examine the 
State's evidence to isolate those inconsistencies which 
, I 
I 
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would compel reversal of the guilty verdict. This task 
is easily disposed of because there are none. The 
prosecutrix's description of the incident is internally 
consistent and substantially corroborated by appellant's 
testimony. The prosecutrix's avowal of fear of physical 
abuse is reasonable in light of appellant's threat of 
violence and physical restraint of her at such a desolate 
locale so late at night. The appellant himself admitted 
that he forced the prosecutrix to comply with his demand 
a!1ci i:o):pressed rec:cret and fear of the possible consequences 
of his behavior (2xhibit 1-P). The coherence a!1d 
conc~~siveness of the State's case de~onstra~~ ~~a~ t~ 2 
jury's verdict is Kell founded. 
POINT II 
THE JURY PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE 
PROSECUTRIX'S RESISTANCE WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO ESTABLISH RAPE. 
The s-:.a:-idard o:: rcsistar,ce suffici·2nt to nega~e 
consent in a charge of rape was established by the Utah 
Criminal Code, Section 76-5-406(1) and (2): 
Sexual intercourse, sodomy, or sexual 
abuse without consent of victim . 
Circumstances . . . An act of sexual inter-
course, sodomy, or sexual abuse is without 
consent of the victim under the following 
circuns~ances: 
(1) When the actor compels the victim to 
sub~it or participate b~ force that ov0rcon~s 
such earnest resistance as miaht rc~son~bl~ 
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rise 
(2) The actor compels the victim to 
sub'.Tli"': or participate by any threat that wculd 
prevent resistance by a person of ordinary 
resolution. 
Appellant contends that a verbal threat does not 
to the level of force necessary to negate consent. 
Appellant asserts this argument despite the clear language 
of Section 76-5-406(2), which states that submission may be 
compelled by threat alone if such threat would prevent 
resistance by a person of ordinary resolution. See also 
State v. Reddish, 550 P.2d 728 (1976). 
Since the trial court properly instructed the jury 
regarding the applicable law, the question here to be 
resolved is whether the jury could find that appellant's 
-::~reat prevented resistance by the prosecutrix. Appellant 
insists that ~he Su?re~e Court has already answered this 
~uestion in Sta-::e v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 162, 3&4 P.2d 109 
(1961), when it found that the prosecutrix made no effort to 
escape and sustained no injury, and thus "her claim that 
consent had been obtained by force or fear was not substan-
-::·::_a-::eci }::;~-the =··icie:~ce'' (?,p~:·c::Cla:-:c::'s Brief, p. 5). Appella;~t 
conveniently overlooks these facts of the Horne case which 
C~ur-::'s a-::-::en-::::_on: 
During the three hour period defendant 
was in her bedroom the prosecutrix made no 
outcry. This despite the fact that all doc;>rs 
and windows were open and there were occupied 
trailers within 20 to 30 feet from hers. 
The prosecutrix did not attempt to leave the 
trailer to seek help although she had ample 
opportunity. . There was no evi~ence of marks 
or bruises upon either party. This after an 
alleged struggle which lasted three hours. 
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Acpellant's comparison is strained indeed. True, the 
prosecutrix in the instant case made no outcry; but unlike 
the Horne si tua ti on, no one was in the vicinity to hear her 
cries. True, the prosecutrix in the instant case made no 
attempt to escape after her first attempt was thwarted; but 
unlike the Horne situation, she had no further opDortunitv 
to flee. \·Jhen the orosecutrix got out of the truck to remove 
her clothing, so also did appellant. Moreover, the isolated 
location provided an insurmountable obstacle to escape. 
True, the prosecutrix in the instant case was not injured or 
brcise:'.; cc::t c::nli'ze ti'!e Horne situation, she did :JCJi: claim to 
~a~e s~rugcle~ aga~nst ancellant because of the great Fear 
i:1l!ere:J.tl:,' L';::rci::acle as to be 'Jnworthv of belief." Id. at L 
Finally, appellant argues that the Utah Supreme 
Court decisions which affirm race convictions involve force 
distinguished from Horne and from the instant case. RevieH 
bu apcellan~ is without merit. Once again apcellant has 
rnisreoresented the thrust of the Court's opinions by focusi~ 
on the ~uanturn of ohysical force emoloyed by defendants 
rather than considering the Court's rationale for its decisio~' 
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statec: 
In State v. Nune~. 520 P.2d 881 (Utah 1974), the court 
Othe~ than pleading and crying, the 
prosecutrix offered li~tle physical 
resistance, but she did testify that she 
greatly feared physical abuse from the 
defendant and his companions should she 
resist . . there is nothing to indicate 
that the prosecutrix consented or that 
her conduct would tend to create the 
impression in the mind of the defendant 
that the prosecutrix had in fact consented. 
Id. at 882. Contrary to appellant's contention, the Nunez 
case s~cports respondent's position. During the trial of the 
·- - - - c:_ -, 
- - - - - - -- -· 
a~~ had teen fearfcl of the ~ossible 
:~e o~ly inference ~hich ca~ be 
dra from this admission of regret is that at the time he 
had intercourse with the prosecutrix appellant realized that 
T~is infe~ence is fortified bv apcellant's 
statev..ent to police that he "forced" the prosecutrix to have 
~poel:ant also cites State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700 (Utah 
197 4) , as distinguishable from State v. Horne, supra, and from 
the instant case because Mr. Studham used physical force to 
o~erco~e his victim . That credence in such a distinction is 
... ~~:=·-=_c.-:-:::::_~ i~ cb'·ious :ro:r t~e Stu,:3.~ai:"'. decision itself. In 
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. a sounder view is recognized 
that bruising and terrorizinq of the 
senses and sensibilities can be just as 
real and just as wrong as the beating ~nd 
bruising of the flesh; and that the 
law should afford a woman protection, not onl\· 
from Physical violence, but from having 
her feelings and sensibilities outraged 
bv force or fear in violation of what she 
is entitled to regard and protect as the 
integrity of her person. Accordingly, in 
deterrining whether the victim's will 
and resistance were overcome, it is ap-
propriate to consider that this may be 
accomplished by either physical force 
and violence or by psychological or 
emotional stress imposed upon her. 
Id. at 702 (emn~asis added). 
-~=ter 
appellant threatened violence, the prosecutrix atteDoted ~ 
flee, but was physically restrained by appellant who stated 
she ~ould not be ~armed i~ she subm~t. 
psychological stress was imcosed on her did the prosecutrix 
physical and psychological force sufficient to negate 
consent. 
-8-
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CONCLUSION 
The law requires evidence of resistance "as might 
reasonably be expected under the circumstances" to support 
a conviction of rape. The question to be resolved with 
respect to sufficiency of the evidence is not whether a 
reasonable doubt may have existed, but whether a reasonable 
doubt is compelled by the evidence. Only under such cir-
cumstances should a jury verdict be reversed. In this case, 
t'1e e'.'idence clearlv demonstrates reasonable resistance by 
the ~rosecutrix, and therefore the jury verdict should stand. 
=es~cn~ent urges that this Court affirm the ruling of the trial 
cour~ fin~ina a~oellant auilty of rape. 
Rescectfull~ sub~itted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
ROBERT R. i'IALLACE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys· fer Respondent 
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